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Abstract 
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contrary to the intuition given by Shorrocks [1978a] who stated, that higher relative mobility 
will cause higher equalization of incomes when the accounting period is extended. 
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1 Introduction
There are reasonable grounds, [...] for supposing that the existence of mo-
bility causes inequality to decline as the accounting interval grows. Fur-
thermore the intuition suggests that the extent to which inequality declines
will be directly related to the frequency and magnitude of relative income
variations.[Shorrocks, 1978a]
In this paper the second part of this statement will be challenged using cross country
data from the European Community Household Panel. We will calculate the mobility
measures axiomatized by Fields and Ok [1999] to get the magnitude of the relative
income variation and the index by Fields [2004] to measure the ability to equalize
incomes over time.
Closely related to this article is the study by Ayala and Sastre [2002] who considered
a broad range of diﬀerent mobility measures and compare several European countries
and the United States. They used data from the ECHP from the years 1994 to 1998.
There aim is to connect the diﬀerent notions of mobility to inequality, however, what
has been left out was the essential index by Fields [2004] that gives a direct connection
of inequality and mobility.
2 Data Description
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) provides us with household in-
come data from diﬀerent sources. The source of income that underlies our analysis is
total net household income (ECHP code HI100) post-tax and post-transfers. So this
income can be interpreted as the disposable income for the household. Furthermore
all households that had zero income in any of the waves under investigation have been
removed. Some further trimming was recommended, because, as Cowell and Schluter
[1998] point out, mobility measures are very sensitive to data contamination, that has
happened in several aspects (like the adjustment from gross and net wages by statistical
authorities, either gross or net reportings of capital income depending on the intervie-
wee as pointed out by Ayala and Sastre [2002, p. 5]). In this case I trimmed the data as
described in Ayala and Sastre [2002]2 and didn't ﬁnd diﬀerent rankings of the countries,
so I kept using the untrimmed data in order to get as many observations as possible.
2I dropped the 1% centile and the 99% centile of each country
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To adjust for demographic events like birth of a child or death of a household member
and diﬀerent household sizes I am using the OECD scale for equalizing size(HD004), with
which I divided HH income (1 + 0.7(adults− 1) + 0.5(HH size− adults)).
To make incomes comparable we used PPP rates provided in the ECHP (PPPyy).
Incomes are expressed in 1995 prices using the consumer price indices for each country
provided by the World Bank. What is considered is therefore the real mobility, so we
are interested in what a household actually can aﬀord.
The observation points are from 1995, 1998 and 2001 and includes all EU-15 coun-
tries except of Finland and Sweden. I used aggregate household data because 98% of all
households reported positive income. However in more than a third of all entries from
wave one to weave three at least some imputation has been made [see Peracchi, 2002].
Controlling for imputation, i.e. using only data that has not been imputed, gives slight
changes in the values of the indices, but hardly changes the ranking of the countries. A
disadvantage of household data is that one is unable to assess income distribution over
its members. For completeness, it is worth noting, that a balanced panel has been used
according to be able to construct the mobility measures.
Choosing the household as the unit of analysis would give rise to numerous problems
as Ayala and Sastre [2002] point out. One of it is that changes in the income assigned
to an individual may be due to variations in the income of the household to which he
or she belongs or to changes in its composition. Furthermore, if mobility measures that
have welfare interpretations are used, all individuals in the household are attributed
the same level of welfare. To resolve the ﬁrst issue, the OECD equivalence scale helps
to keep track of the changing composition of the household, the second problem can
not be resolved easily, because it would require consumption data of each individual
member of the family.
3 Methodology
In the following the concepts used in the empirical part are introduced and discussed.
I will begin with the inequality measures and continue with the mobility indices.
3.1 Inequality Measures
Theil's measure comes from entropy theory in information economics [Theil, 1967,
see] that evaluates the informational value of a situation. It can be reinterpreted im-
2
mediately into a measure of inequality by viewing the probability of an event as the
individual's proportion of total income. Let yi be the share of total income the ith per-
son obtains. Let h(y) be a decreasing function of y (h(y) = log 1
y
is commonly used).
Let H(y) =
∑n
i=1 yih(yi) =
∑n
i=1 yi log
1
yi
be the measure of entropy or the information
content. It reaches is maximum when yi = 1/n for all i. This leads us to following
measure of inequality:
T = log n−H(y) =
n∑
i=1
yi log nyi
With the interpretation that the higher T the more unequal the income distribution.
Gini Coeﬃcient The Gini coeﬃcient can be deﬁned as the ratio of the area between
the Lorenz curve and the line of absolute equality and the area underneath the diagonal.
It is deﬁned as:
G = [1/(2n2y¯)]
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj|
The Gini coeﬃcient is bounded between 0 and 1. Highest inequality is denoted
by 1 (in Lorenz interpretation 1 household possess 100% of economies income the rest
nothing) lowest inequality is 0 (Lorenz curve equals line of absolute equality)
Mean Log Deviation takes more care at income transfers at the lower end, because
it staggers the income distribution. Furthermore taking the diﬀerences of logs eliminates
the dependence on the scale because what goes in multiplicative at units falls out when
taking logs and subtracting it from the mean. Let yi now be the income of household i
in levels and n the number of households in the economy. The measure is then deﬁned
as:
(1) H =
[
n∑
i=1
(log y¯ − log yi)2/n
]1/2
One problem is, that this measure is not independent of the mean of the population's
income.
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3.2 Mobility Measures
Income mobility is a concept that has to be analyzed across various dimensions, because
it is so multi-facetted and the literature does not give a unique of what mobility is.
In his seminal paper on income mobility, Shorrocks [1978b] stated a few desiderata
for mobility measures and showed that no index exists that can satisfy all of them.
However, some of this desiderata apply speciﬁcally to inter-generational mobility where
time-independence plays a signiﬁcant role to evaluate the mobility process (see the
discussion in Fields and Ok [1996]). A possible solution to this problem of multi-
dimensionality of mobility is, to use several diﬀerent measures, that are - in the best
case - orthogonal to each other and therefore to get a more complete picture of income
movements over time.
To classify mobility measures two branches can be thought as meaningful. (1) purely
statistical measures that obey well deﬁned axioms and (2) welfareist measures that try
to evaluate mobility according to their eﬀects on social welfare (interesting contributions
to this topic have been made - among others - by Dardanoni [1993] and Gottschalk and
Spolaore [2002]). Furthermore there are statistical measures that can be ﬁlled with
social utility interpretation [see Fields and Ok, 1999, for a detailed discussion]. It
seems to be quite common to assign welfare properties to measures of mobility, where
underlying social welfare functions are assumed that use personal or household income
as a source of individual utility.
I am not convinced, that the data with which I am applying these measures on
allow any statements about welfare, because I do not take into account the conditions a
household is living and wether the a change in household's income was due to transfers
received because of serious diseases. Furthermore the distribution of income within the
household is completely neglected, and for welfare is a purely individualistic concept,
an evaluation on the household level does not seem appropriate.
So I will focus mainly on following two measures: (1) the total per household log-
income movement in an economy, that can be disentangled in a transfer and a growth
component and (2) measure to evaluate a countries ability to equalize lifetime income.
These measures convey the information needed to challenge the statement by Shorrocks
[1978a].
The basic framework we are in is described by a population of households N =
1, ..., n. The income of household i at time t ∈ 0, 1 is denoted as yti . The income
distribution at time t is written as yt = yt1, ..., y
t
n. An income distribution is deﬁned by
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a cdf F : R+ → [0, 1] with ﬁnite mean µF . Take X ⊂ R+ as the set of feasible incomes.
Let F(X) the class of all income distributions whose support is contained in a given
subset X ⊆ R+.
A mobility process is deﬁned as a function M : R+×X → [0, 1] such that M(·|y) ∈
F(X) for all y ∈ X. The basic question is how to evaluate the transition from y0 to y1.
Fields and Ok [1999] The mobility index axiomatized by Fields and Ok [1999] is a
measure of the total absolute log-income movement in a society. It is given by:
(2) mFO99n = c
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
| log y1i − log y0i|
)
for all x, y ∈ Rn++
Following properties fully characterize this measure:
• Scale Invariance: for all x, y ∈ Rn++ and λ > 0, mn(λx, λy) = mn(x, y)
• Symmetry: For all x, y ∈ Rn++,mn(x, y) = mn(y, x)
• Subgroup Decomposabilitymn((x1, . . . , xJ), (y1, . . . , yJ)) =
∑J
j=1
(nj
n
)
mnj(x
j, yj)
• Multiplicative Path Separability For any ∈ Rn++, α ≥ 1 and β ∈ [1, α],mn(x, αx) =
mn(x, βx) +mn(βx, αx)
This is the absolute mobility index that does not take into account the direction of
the mobility, because of the symmetry axiom. The directional measure  as suggested
by its name  takes into account the direction of mobility where higher income growth
leads to higher mobility. In this case symmetry has to be give up and is replaced by
following two properties:
mFO99dirn (x, y) = −mFO99dirn (y, x) and mFO99dirn (x, αx) = mFO99dirn (x, x)
For α > 1 and x, y ∈ Rn++. The ﬁrst property means that if x → y is a "good"
movement y → x has to be a "bad" movement in the sense of more or less mobile.
The second property just states that a proportional increase for all incomes has to be
a good movement. The directional measure ﬁts in a utilitarian framework. Take the
unit elasticity utility function as a function of real income U(a) = log a. mFO99n has the
interpretation of the aggregate change in social welfare.
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The measure for relative income movements decomposability into two components
(1) total social utility growth and (2) total social utility transfer. It can be written as
follows:
(3) mFO99n (y0, y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
per capita income movement
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(log y1i − log y0i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
per capita social mobility growth
+
2
n
∑
i∈L
(log y0i − log y1i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
per capita social mobility transfer
Where L ≡ {i : y0i > y1i} is the set of individuals whose income has decreased over
time. The ﬁrst component measures the total income growth of these two components
the second part adds the components that has been lost by the losers (due of the
assumption of positive growth, one has to add twice the amount lost by the losers,
because everything lost by the losers has been gained by some winners). It is worth
noting, that the growth component is exactly the directional measure deﬁned in (3.2).
However, as all measures of mobility, it cannot describe all aspects of mobility. It
fulﬁlls the some basic axioms that have been given as desiderata for mobility measures
in the literature: (1) monotonicity (2) axiom of diagonalizing switches (3) monotonicity
in distance. The relation of these axioms with the proposed measure are discussed in
Fields and Ok [1996]. It is complementary to the traditional quintile transition matrix
measures, because it is "insensitive to rerankings beyond what would be implied by the
income changes themselves." [Fields and Ok, 1996].
Mobility as long term equalizing phenomenon Fields [2004] To measure an
income mobility process several measures or ranking devices have been considered in
the recent literature . For example Benabou and Ok [2001] consider a technique taken
from the taxation literature to rank countries according to their ability to equalize
opportunities, i.e. to make future incomes origin independent. Fields [2004] criticizes
the approach taken from the taxation literature and illustrates it with the following
example. Take two income transitions I : (1, 3) → (1, 5) and II : (1, 3) → (5, 1). In
both cases income inequality is more unequal in the second period compared to the ﬁrst
period.
Fields [2004] argues that the question to answer is wether a mobility process is
lifetime income equalizing. To measure wether a it can achieve this goal, approaches
taken from the tax literature are not valid. This is because the feature of the taxation
approach looks at the change from an already realized disposable income distribution at
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time 0 to a realized income distribution at time 1. The diﬀerence is striking, because in
the tax literature one compares a realized but not paid out distribution with the distri-
bution of disposable incomes. Therefore the interpretation of opportunity equalization
is doubtful.
To resolve this problems he suggests following index:
(4) mF04 = 1− I(y¯)
I(y0)
Where I(·) is a static inequality measure (in this application the Gini coeﬃcient will
be used, although Theil's measure or mean log deviation could also be used) and y¯ is
the vector of average income over the two periods3. The axioms underlying mF04 are:
Let I(·) be an inequality measure and yl = (y¯1, ..., y¯n), ys = (y0,1, ..., y0,n) be vectors
of long-term and short-term incomes, respectively. Then mF04 has following properties:
Normalization I(l) = I(s)⇒ E(·) = 0, so if the inequality is the same for long-term and
short-term income then no mobility takes place. Equalization I(l) < I(s) ⇒ E(·) >
0, when inequality is reduced over longer horizon then the index gets positive. On
the contrary if inequality is larger in the long run, then the index gets negative, so
disequalization means I(l) > I(s)⇒ E(·) < 0.
To compare two diﬀerent income regimes one speaks about Greater Equalization if
1. For two alternative l vectors l1, l2 ∈ L and given a vector s ∈ S, I(l1) < I(l2) <
I(s)⇒ Es,l1 > Es,l2
2. For two alternative s vectors s1, s2 ∈ S and given a vector l ∈ L, I(s1) > I(s2) >
I(l)⇒ Es1,l > Es2,l
and of Greater Disequalization if
1. For two alternative l vectors l1, l2 ∈ L and given a vector s ∈ S, I(l1) > I(l2) >
I(s)⇒ Es,l1 < Es,l2
2. For two alternative s vectors s1, s2 ∈ S and given a vector l ∈ L, I(l) > I(s1) >
I(s2)⇒ Es2,l > Es1,l
From these axioms it follows for E(I(l), I(s)) that it is decreasing in I(l), increasing
in I(s) and equal zero when I(l) = I(s).
3With panel data, long-term income is better observable by taking the average of all years from
19962001.
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Fields states that this proposed measure is closely related to the measure by Chakravarty,
Dutta and Weymark [1985]. Although the latter index was not constructed to test
equalization of life time incomes but give ethical advice, whether mobility has to be
regarded as positive. Fields states that its design ﬁts better to the question he poses
than to the one it has been used for, because  from an ethical perspective  it gives
too much weight to the equalizing part of mobility (which is on the other hand good
for the assessment wether the mobility process is income equalizing).
3.3 Some illustrative examples
Table 3.3 provides you with the numerical values of the mobility indices, described in
the following.
Bill Gates gets richer vs Bill Gates gets poorer Consider following changes
of an income distribution at period 0 (10, ..., 10︸ ︷︷ ︸
49 times
, 1000) → (10, ..., 10︸ ︷︷ ︸
49 times
, 10000) versus
(10, ..., 10︸ ︷︷ ︸
49 times
, 1000) → (10, ..., 10︸ ︷︷ ︸
49 times
, 500). In the ﬁrst case the Fields measure gets negative,
because the process leaves long term incomes more unequal than period 0 incomes. In
the second case we have more equality of incomes in the second period and therefore
the long term inequality drops, which leads to the indication of more mobility than in
the ﬁrst period. The Fields and Ok measure gives us opposite results when comparing
these two processes. Because the rise of Bill Gates' income in the ﬁrst case is much
higher than the drop he experiences in the second case the Fields and Ok measure
attributes more mobility to the ﬁrst case than to the second.
Doubling of Income Take the situation from the previous example and let the period
0 income double from period 0 to period 1. According tho the Fields 2004 measure there
is no mobility, because the distribution of incomes over individuals has not changed.
However, there is a substantial part of mobility in the Fields and Ok measure of which
100 percent can be attributed to growth.
Complete vs incomplete income reversal Take again a population of 50 peo-
ple and let the change of the income distribution be as follows: (1, 2, ,˙49, 50) →
((50, 49, ,˙2, 1)). This is the case of complete income reversal. The Fields measure
attributes full mobility to this process, because it completely equalizes long run in-
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Fields and Ok [1999] Fields [2004]
total growth transfer
Gates gets richer 0.046 0.046 0.000 -0.379
Gates gets poorer 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.102
Complete Income reversal 1.299 0.000 1.299 0.509
Incomplete Income reversal 1.267 0.124 1.142 1.000
doubling of income 0.693 0.693 0.000 0.000
come. For the other measure we get also some mobility of which all can be attributed
to the transfer component, because overall income stays the same. Now take a similar
process except of the fact that the richest person gets even richer (the change has to be
larger than 49). Fields measure would attribute to this process lower mobility than to
the complete income reversal, because long-run incomes are are not perfectly equalized.
However, the Fields and Ok measure attributes more mobility to the incomplete income
reversal, because additionally to the income reversal, there is overall income growth in
the economy.
Symmetry of mFOn Due to the symmetry axiom of the Fields and Ok [1999] the
measure of income movement takes Paretian welfare evaluations out of mobility mea-
surement. E.g. take the the two processes (1, 2)→ (2, 3) and (2, 3)→ (1, 2) the former
process is certainly more desirable than the second but in the sense of the measure they
are equally mobile, because each household experienced the same monetary income
change. To get back a little bit of welfare interpretation to this approach, one can use
the directional measure that reduces the amount of mobility when incomes fall from
one period to the next. According to this measure the latter process is more mobile
than the former.
Rerankings Consider now following income distributions [e.g. Fields and Ok, 1996]:
x = (1, 2, 5), y = (1, 4, 5) and z = (3, 2, 5). While the transition from x→ y and y → z
are considered equally mobile by the Fields and Ok index, the Fields index appoints
higher mobility to the second process, because incomes are distributed more equally in
the long run due to the reranking of individual 1 and 2.
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4 Results
In this study I take a cross-country perspective, although an additional longitudinal as-
pect comes into play by separating the observation period 1995 to 2001 into two shorter
periods: 1995 to 1998 and 1998 to 2001. In the following two sections the inequalities
of European countries are compared and the two mobility measures introduced in the
previous section are calculated.
4.1 Comparison of inequality
In table 4.1 you can see diﬀerent inequality measures for the 13 countries over three
years: 1995, 1998 and 2001. The long term inequality measures of 4.1 have been
calculated using the average of the three years income for every household. The Gini
coeﬃcient ranges from 0.23746 in Portugal to 0.38389 in Portugal in 1995. The spread
over Europe became slightly smaller in 2001, going from .23934 to 0.37221. The ranking
of the countries at the top and the bottom remained the same, while there were some
minor changes of place in the middle. The inequality indices are in line with Ayala and
Sastre [2002] and others who used the same data set.
Table 1: Comparison of Inequality Measures between 1996 and 2001
Country 1995 1998 2001
Gini95 Theil95 MLD95 Gini98 Theil98 MLD98 Gini01 Theil01 MLD01
Germany (SOEP) 0.27736 0.13812 0.15171 0.25376 0.11309 0.11276 0.25330 0.11481 0.11019
Denmark 0.23746 0.11182 0.09910 0.23331 0.10385 0.09729 0.23934 0.10632 0.10399
Netherlands 0.28152 0.14717 0.15340 0.26451 0.13307 0.12636 0.25268 0.11488 0.11398
Belgium 0.28776 0.16306 0.16756 0.28188 0.15895 0.14570 0.30280 0.22958 0.16808
Luxembourg (PSELL) 0.26185 0.12085 0.11434 0.26332 0.12599 0.11612 0.26105 0.12100 0.11318
France 0.30229 0.16574 0.17324 0.28539 0.14336 0.14272 0.28198 0.13629 0.14353
UK (BHPS) 0.33075 0.20367 0.19959 0.32076 0.18308 0.17989 0.31798 0.19916 0.17990
Ireland 0.32799 0.19498 0.18139 0.32084 0.18561 0.16911 0.32250 0.19116 0.18036
Italy 0.33546 0.20349 0.23097 0.31419 0.17983 0.18839 0.30450 0.16875 0.17222
Greece 0.36689 0.23991 0.24066 0.36552 0.23617 0.23857 0.33946 0.19763 0.19829
Spain 0.33246 0.19008 0.20714 0.33817 0.20098 0.21548 0.32290 0.19283 0.20028
Portugal 0.38389 0.25798 0.27038 0.38086 0.25677 0.26216 0.37221 0.25025 0.24212
Austria 0.29074 0.14622 0.15592 0.27142 0.12800 0.13024 0.26763 0.12211 0.12839
Comparing the long term inequality measure in table 4.1 with the measures of any
single year, one can see that long term income inequality is smaller than any observation
for a single year, the question now is to which extent this has happened. An answer to
this question will be given by the mobility index of Fields [2004] in the next section.
The most equal countries in the long run are: The Netherlands, Denmark and Germany,
where on the other side of the scale Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece can be found.
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Table 2: Long Term Income Inequality: 95, 98 and 01
Country long term (95,98,01)
Gini Theil MLD
Germany (SOEP) 0.23617 0.09782 0.09234
Denmark 0.20462 0.07710 0.06990
Netherlands 0.23716 0.09767 0.09111
Belgium 0.25969 0.14264 0.11815
Luxembourg (PSELL) 0.24540 0.10538 0.09847
France 0.26512 0.11911 0.11491
UK (BHPS) 0.28794 0.15049 0.13736
Ireland 0.29567 0.15558 0.14064
Italy 0.28373 0.14403 0.13814
Greece 0.31968 0.17184 0.17037
Spain 0.29932 0.15810 0.14705
Portugal 0.35260 0.21872 0.20599
Austria 0.24586 0.10045 0.09949
4.2 Comparison of mobility
Fields and Ok [1999] Table 4.2 gives detailed results of the Fields and Ok [1999]
mobility measure. The ﬁgures reported here are mFO99/
∑N
i=1 y0i. The countries under
consideration are very heterogeneous according not only to the magnitude of relative
income mobility experienced but also by the composition of growth and transfer.
Portugal exhibited the largest relative mobility over the entire period of which almost
80% can be attributed to the growth component. This is not surprising because of
Portugal's rapid growth in the 1990s. Quite diﬀerent is the situation in Austria, while
overall relative mobility puts it in the middle of the ranking, the transfer component
contributes over 43% of total mobility and therefore is both absolutely and relative to
total mobility among the highest in Europe whereas the growth component is among
the lowest. Countries that also show considerable contribution of growth to mobility are
the UK, Portugal, Spain and Greece, while countries like Ireland, Denmark, Belgium
and Austria exhibit the lowest growth components.
According to the Fields [2004] index all European countries are long term income
equalizing, because their indices are positive. There is, however some variation in
the equalization across countries. At the lower end of the scale one ﬁnds Luxembourg,
Portugal, France, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark, while on the upper end are Germany,
the Netherlands and Italy. Of these countries, it seems rather surprising that Italy is
the most equalizing country among the EU-13.
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Table 3: Fields and Ok [1999] Mobility Index: Change over Periods
Country 1995-1998 1998-2001 1995-2001
Total Growth Transfer Total Growth Transfer Total Growth Transfer
Luxembourg (PSELL) 0.1988 0.0997 0.0991 0.2097 0.1258 0.0839 0.3058 0.2255 0.0803
Portugal 0.3613 0.1865 0.1748 0.2407 0.1338 0.1069 0.5062 0.4036 0.1026
Ireland 0.2595 0.0903 0.1693 0.3395 0.2171 0.1225 0.3697 0.2755 0.0942
Spain 0.3168 0.0913 0.2255 0.2377 0.1452 0.0924 0.3439 0.2058 0.1381
Greece 0.4026 0.1604 0.2422 0.2697 0.1670 0.1027 0.3862 0.2209 0.1653
France 0.2667 0.1417 0.1250 0.2407 0.0841 0.1566 0.3339 0.2145 0.1194
UK (BHPS) 0.3490 0.1811 0.1679 0.2227 0.0781 0.1446 0.4806 0.3023 0.1783
Denmark 0.2588 0.1449 0.1140 0.2956 0.1306 0.1650 0.4426 0.3158 0.1268
Belgium 0.2780 0.1217 0.1563 0.2364 0.0697 0.1667 0.4653 0.3237 0.1416
Austria 0.2743 0.0504 0.2240 0.3222 0.1426 0.1796 0.3767 0.2173 0.1593
Netherlands 0.2964 0.2058 0.0907 0.2864 0.0929 0.1935 0.3689 0.2691 0.0997
Germany (SOEP) 0.2647 0.1239 0.1408 0.3502 0.1419 0.2083 0.3863 0.2839 0.1025
Italy 0.3618 0.1704 0.1915 0.3520 0.2245 0.1274 0.4343 0.2633 0.1710
As expected and already stated by Shorrocks [1978a] the equalization of long term
incomes gets stronger when the accounting period is extended. Very strong eﬀects of the
extension compared to the average of the subperiod indices could be found in Ireland
and Spain with over 70% increase whereas in Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark this
eﬀect was rather small with only 16− 26% increase.
Table 4: Fields [2004] mobility measure: Comparison over Periods
Country 1995-1998 1998-2001 1995-2001
Luxembourg (PSELL) 0.0650 0.0402 0.0813
Portugal 0.0683 0.0554 0.1061
Ireland 0.0696 0.0689 0.1090
Spain 0.0711 0.0692 0.1159
Greece 0.0818 0.0693 0.1190
France 0.0833 0.0734 0.1207
UK (BHPS) 0.0918 0.0756 0.1278
Denmark 0.0956 0.0759 0.1345
Belgium 0.0999 0.0855 0.1375
Austria 0.1096 0.0914 0.1477
Netherlands 0.1141 0.0957 0.1549
Germany (SOEP) 0.1187 0.1015 0.1627
Italy 0.1247 0.1095 0.1716
A more striking result I obtained when looking jointly at the relative mobility mea-
sure by Fields and Ok [1999] and the Fields [2004] measure over the period 1995-2001.
Figure 4.2 shows that the evidence that relative mobility and the ability to equalize
long-run incomes goes hand in hand is rather weak. Excluding Luxembourg the cor-
relation between those indices becomes even negative. This result certainly challenges
the intuition given by Shorrocks [1978a], who claimed positive correlation.
In ﬁgure 4.2 the growth component is plotted vs the ability of long-run equalization.
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Figure 1: Total Relative Mobility vs. Long Term Income Equalization
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Figure 2: Growth vs Equalization of Incomes
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Figure 3: Transfer vs Equalization of Incomes
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If we see a combination of a high growth component4 and a high Fields index 5 as "good"
mobility then we could ﬁgure out countries that are unambiguously better than others.
However this interpretation can not be given, because countries with low ability of
equalization like Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France and Portugal have
a very wide variation in the growth component, while countries with higher relative
mobility tend to ﬂuctuate around a growth component of 0.27. An interesting case is
Portugal, that experienced a high proportion of income mobility due to growth but was
not able to equalize incomes over the observation period, a result that suggests that
mainly upper income classes could beneﬁt from extraordinary growth.
The relationship of the transfer component and the Fields index can be observed
in ﬁgure 4.2. The correlation between those two indices across countries is 0.4048
which indicates a clear positive relationship between those variables and it still remains
positive at 0.2, when Luxembourg is excluded from the sample. This suggests, that
transfer as deﬁned by that index is redistribution from richer households to poorer,
4this could be argued through the welfareist interpretation of the growth component
5As argued by Jarvis and Jenkins [1998] that mobility is good when it equalizes opportunities
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where a higher level of transfer meant also a higher equalization of incomes in the
EU-13.
5 Conclusion
In this article I looked at two diﬀerent measures of mobility to compare 13 diﬀerent
European countries. The measures were total relative mobility, divided into a growth
and transfer component, and the equalization of long-term incomes. What I found was
a negative relationship between these two indices, when excluding Luxembourg from
the sample, which is contrary to the intuition given by Shorrocks [1978a]. There is no
clear relationship between the growth component and the equalization process, while
transfer and equalization are strongly correlated.
Further research has to be done in looking for determinants of wage mobility. Theo-
retical underpinnings can mostly be found in the search literature (see Jovanovic [1979]
or Burdett [1978]) and the newer literature on job information networks [see Ioannides
and Loury, 2004].
Appendix
5.1 Variables used from ECHP
Variable Description
HD001 Household Size
HD004 Equivalised Size, OECD Scale
HI100 Total Household net income
HI100X Total Household Net Imputation Index (0-1)
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